The Obama administration announced in 2011 its intention to pivot strategically towards Asia. Ten years later, it was clear that this strategy had evolved, moving from strategic rebalancing to the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy under Trump. However, had American diplomacy and defence's centre of gravity truly shifted to the Indo-Pacific? Regarding foreign policy, the woefully inadequate President Trump compromised this strategy by withdrawing the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and accelerating the American withdrawal from world affairs when China was consolidating its position in the Indo-Pacific.
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The U.S.- Chinese relationship should not be considered as a zero-sum game, nor can the emergence of a prosperous and powerful China be assumed in itself to be an American strategic defeat – Henry Kissinger
The United States' grand strategy of a pivot to Asia was formalised in the autumn of 2011 which built on the thoughts and initiatives developed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Assistant Secretary for Asia Kurt Campbell, who presented a pivot towards the Asia-Pacific to be made possible by the disengagement from Iraq and Afghanistan and pushed forward by the growth of American interests in this area. It did not preclude maintaining a robust commitment to security and stability in Europe and the Middle East and a global approach to countering violent extremists and terrorist threats, emphasising the Middle East and Africa (Pietrzak, 2019). American leaders, aware of the ambiguous nature of the term “pivot” and the concerns aroused among their allies, preferred to use the term “rebalancing”, which corresponded better to the modesty of the achievements (Harold, 2014).
Announced in an article published in Foreign Policy by Hillary Clinton in 2011 and justified retrospectively by the person who was the mastermind during President Obama's first term, Kurt Campbell, the rebalancing strategy was based on the growth of American interests in the Asia-Pacific zone, it was based by President Obama's major transversal orientations on a range of diplomatic and military tools (Clinton, 2011). It aimed to stabilise the region by deterring North Korea, which remained a threatening state, by preparing and supporting China's almost inevitable rise in power and its capacity to challenge American power in the future by establishing a network of allies and partners in its periphery.
This chapter begins with a literature review of the most relevant recent publications regarding the American pivot to Asia. It will summarise the major theoretical approaches to the topic, providing information that caters to wide-ranging interpretations of the issue. For such a substantial policy, a historical background is vital in order to place the Asia-Pacific Region and the diplomatic and military presence of major actors in such a context. Within this realm, particular actors such as North Korea, which permit regional and global tension to continue, are also addressed. Strategic dialogue with China has been and remains a perennial feature of the American bilateral relationship, which has placed China at the core and the Pacific at the periphery of its regional approach. Traditional allies occupy a central position when evaluating the pivot to Asia policy with the emergence of new partners, particularly in Southeast Asia, focused on the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership. Regarding security, SEATO and ADMM+ are the two essential mechanisms that require evaluation and analysis to draw a clear picture of the pivot that needs to be accentuated with China's Belt and Road Initiative, which is primarily economic and commercial which has potential security implications. Lastly, the chapter focuses on the recent regional developments in the 2020s, focusing on RCEP, IPEF, and the CPTPP.
The American “pivot” announcement towards the Asia-Pacific, made possible by a disengagement from the Iraqi and Afghan theatres, was envisaged first as an internal pivot from Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia, initially raising many questions about its scope (Pietrzak, 2023). Subsequently renamed a “rebalancing” in order to correct the perverse effects of this terminology, first and foremost, the desire attributed to the United States was to contain China, thus lessening attention on Europe and the distorted perception of an increased American presence - notably military - in the region, this reorientation constituted a long-term trend desired by President Obama. Its focus towards the region, which contrasted with its caution - even withdrawal - on the Middle Eastern crises -as well as the strategic issues of the area, contributed to this multifaceted reinvestment (Pietrzak, 2010).