Abstract
The purpose of this work is to examine interagency cooperation within the United States (US) Intelligence Community (IC). To elucidate the importance of interagency interoperability, two cases wherein IC agencies failed to appropriately collaborate are presented: 1) the September 11th attacks of 2001 and 2) the failed bombing by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, also referred to as the underwear bomber. This work begins with a brief review of how interagency issues have quite deep roots in the IC. Then, readers are presented with a review of the two cases that is followed by an in-depth analysis of the factors that were common to both failures. Ultimately, the variations in modus operandi (MO), a lack of clear guidelines, and bureaucracy were identified as the three primary factors of failure in both of the cases. Therefore, the work concludes by recommending improved training and educational opportunities for those in the IC in addition to the establishment of an independent entity that would be responsible for overseeing and guiding interagency activities.
TopBackground
There is clear evidence that security practitioners have continuously sought to identify best practices and strategies through the formation of various internal commissions and committees. For example, consequent to the “fall of the Soviet Union [but prior to] the September 11 attacks, six bipartisan blue-ribbon commissions, three major unclassified government initiatives, and three think tank task forces” were established to investigate security practices (Zegart, 2005, p.86). Such initiatives highlight the importance placed on perpetual growth and improvement within the field. It is also imperative to recognize that intelligence professionals diligently work to rectify mistakes and overcome failures as and when they arise. The most notable example is the production of the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, otherwise known as the 9/11 commission report.
In response to the devastating 9/11 attacks of 2001, the US witnessed the “IC's largest reorganization in more than 30 years” (Rosenbach & Peritz, 2009, p.14). The attacks made the shortcomings of intelligence practices glaringly apparent to intelligence professionals and the nation. Accordingly, based on the recommendations of the 9/11 commission report, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) was created with the aim of enhancing the IC’s capabilities (Tamanaha, 2010, p.419). The IRTPA promoted information sharing, established greater oversight mechanisms, and implemented “new rules for intelligence and law enforcement” (Tamanaha, 2010, p.425).
Key Terms in this Chapter
Intelligence: Information that has been collected, processed, and analyzed in support of the maintenance of national security.
Modus Operandi: A specific approach to handling certain matters or patterns of working.
Bureaucracy: A form of organization characterized by a strict hierarchical structure and chain of command system and stringent division of labor that preserves uniformity.
Interagency: Involving two or more agencies or organizations.
Interagency Interoperability: The ability of intelligence agencies to fairly share information, communicate effectively, and provide support across organizational borders.
Intelligence Community: The collection of eighteen intelligence agencies and organizations within the United States that work separately to uphold national security.
Politicization (in Intelligence): The act of skewing intelligence to fit a specific political narrative or perspective.