The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict: Catalyst for the Resovietization of the East

Introduction: The Road Toward The Resovietization Of The East

Thirty-three years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, one thing is obvious: The resolution of several international crises still depends on relations between the West and Russia. In Libya, Syria, Iran, Ukraine, and perhaps even the Balkans, relations between Moscow and Western countries always seem to be good or bad. Like it or not, this geopolitical situation is a fact which, however, Americans and Europeans have not been duly taken into consideration since 1989. A series of actions testify to this, in particular the European Union’s (EU) neighborhood policy in 2003 and the Eastern Partnership in 2004, with the corollary of the accession of the countries of central Europe (Poland, Croatia, Hungary, and Romania) and the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) to the EU. In addition, in 2009, the EU launched the Eastern Partnership to address six former Soviet republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine), with the aim of mooring them to the EU both economically and politically. The initiative provided for the negotiation of six new separate agreements, the famous Association Agreements (AA) which would unleash so much passion in Kyiv, in order to replace the old partnership and cooperation agreements, which were about to expire. On the other hand, the Eastern Partnership seems to have been created essentially for two reasons: To counterbalance the EU’s Mediterranean policy and to strengthen the EU’s democratic and free trade influence beyond its new eastern border, faced with a Russia perceived, since the Georgian crisis of 2008, as increasingly aggressive and less and less democratic. In response, in 2010, Moscow decided to relaunch its customs union project from Moscow to Astana, via Minsk and Kyiv. This goal would clearly and explicitly arouse fearful U.S. opposition to Russia’s ambition to resovietize Eastern Europe.

This is the permanent confrontation between capitalism and communism.

This perception that Russia has of its own relations with the Western world was further accentuated when, in 2013, the EU offered the AA to Ukraine with special economic advantages, including a clause that prohibited their signatories from adhering to the customs union project proposed by their main trading partner, namely, Russia. Admittedly, the abovementioned agreement was never signed, but a series of actions followed, including the annexation of Crimea by Russia and its corollaries. This crisis has never stopped; rather, it entered a more expansive phase on February 24, 2022: It was the Russian special military operation, for some leaders in Ukraine, Russian interventionism, for others, and the war in Ukraine, for still others. This diversity of viewpoints has given rise to blocs, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its allies, Russia and its allies, and neutral countries, like most African countries.

Moreover, this very tense situation, although it is considered a military operation par excellence, hides an economic dimension that risks dragging the world economy into a certain economic and financial crisis. Indeed, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is already revealing its economic repercussions, particularly the soaring prices of raw materials that are essential for the functioning of industries. Besides, this situation is not without repercussions on the production chain and may ultimately be noticed in the shopping basket, which had already been impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic. This scenario triggers an increased risk of growing poverty in the world, and especially in developing countries. Beyond the economic and financial consequences, it is also necessary to take into account all the serious political effects that could modify the world’s economic trajectory forever.

Indeed, political configurations and considerations have always influenced economic policies within states and unions around the world. Thus, the Ukrainian crisis has revealed the fragilities of the dependence of certain states and unions on raw materials, but also certain military fragilities. Proof of this is Germany’s decision to increase its military investment for the next few years. The world is thus preparing to experience a change in its economic and military trajectory similar to the situation after the Second World War, where each country seeks to reposition itself economically and militarily, but also to create alliances and unions. Therefore, a critical situation prevails and many hypotheses remain perceptible, given the existence of several scenarios and possible balances.