The Ontology of Randomness

The Ontology of Randomness

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-5225-7598-6.ch032
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Abstract

This chapter reviews the existence of randomness, focusing on it existing in terms of what it is not, order. Included are a survey of current views and history of randomness, relevant concepts of whether something exists (ontology), how we know (epistemology), entropy, foundations of order, statistics, prediction, time, and scientific methods. Randomness is tied to determinism, and determinism becomes an issue of free will. Thus, discussions of free will cycle back to whether everything is laid out before us, but this is controversial, at best. We may only act as though there is randomness, similar to acting as though there were free will, even after being told that the universe, indeed, may be deterministic. Such a method is comparable to doing a logic proof in drawing an assumption line and displaying the consequences. Alternate worlds are referenced in which randomness may be seen in a different light.
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Background

The Ontology of Randomness in this Encyclopedia of Information Science and Technology, focuses more on the thinking underpinning science, more specifically, whether randomness even exists, i.e., its ontology (Feibleman, 1951). Tests for randomness appear to assume what is trying to be shown, i.e., there is indeed randomness, begging the question of whether there is innate structure, or order, in the universe.

Because of very limited space, extended tutorials and discussions about ontology (the nature of existence), epistemology (how we know), the problems of induction (Hume, 1888; Mill, 1843; Russell, 1919; Ramsey, 1929; Keynes, 1921, pp. 305-314; p. 24 et seq.), stochastic analysis (series of random variables), and the problems of representation (Plato's cave allegory as the philosophical foundations of statistics) have been omitted. Also omitted is a discussion of the role of randomness in logical scientific exploration (Popper, 1934; hypothetico-deductive, 2015; Copi, 1979; Rosser, 1953; Mendelson, 1997; Whewell, 1847; Feyerabend, 1975), as well as discussions of Abraham de Moivre (bell curve), Pierre-Simon Laplace (calculus of probabilities), and martingales (Birnbaum and Lukas, 1980). There are many other conversations about the differences between probability, chance (Keynes, 1921; Eagle, 2010), and randomness that would enrich a more complete treatment of the subject. This says nothing of the hundreds of mainstream works of probability theorists and their views on randomness. Instead, given here is somewhat analogous to a brief literature search, with a focus on summarizing several main views of what people think randomness is and considering the implication of its existence status. If such can get the reader to think beyond technology, focusing more on the “why”, then this chapter will have accomplished its goal.

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