Miscalculated Cause-and-Effect: The Russian Invasion of Ukraine and Finland's Accession to NATO

Existential Vocational Crisis

This crisis was inseparable from the apparent conversion of the Russian Federation to the values and principles of Western democracies and the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, (Matějka, 1997). The Yeltsin presidency had not led NATO to give up its role as the armed wing of the Western powers in the face of an adversary that was less clearly identified but revealed a new vocation as a collective animator of a partnership for peace between the belligerents of yesteryear. This second vocation gradually faded over the past twenty years under the effect of the reaffirmed ambitions and the rediscovered aggressiveness of Vladimir Putin's leadership.

In 2014 NATO began to return to its true mission and raison d'etre due to the defiant posture of Russia, which until then was still considered a partner by the Alliance, (Trenin, 2009). As early as 2008, the occupation by the Russian army of part of Georgian territory had raised concerns. Six years later, the illegal annexation of Crimea and then the outbreak of war in the Ukrainian region of Donbas led to the strengthening of the collective defence pillar of the Alliance. During the Newport Summit in 2014, the Allies created a rapid reaction force (NATO Response Force - NRF) on alert at very short notice, and two years later, in Warsaw, the reinforced forward presence was set up (Enhanced Forward Presence – EFP), a permanent contingent stationed at and from Europe, intended to deter Russia from carrying out further destabilizing actions in its regional environment, (Allers, 2017).