Europeanisation in Southeastern Europe: Revisiting the Role of EU Conditionality

Europeanisation in Southeastern Europe: Revisiting the Role of EU Conditionality

Theofanis Kakarnias
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-7998-9055-3.ch004
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Abstract

Despite relatively recent enlargement rounds, the European Union (EU) is bound to enlarge even further. Yet, for a country to be admissible into the club, it must have successfully Europeanised in multiple areas. Against that background, this chapter aims to assess why apparently similar candidate countries in the Balkans manage the Europeanisation process with widely divergent degrees of success. To answer that question, a diverse and well-established literature review is accounted for, while applying rationalist and sociological approaches to new unexplored cases and examining specific domestic pre-conditions and factors regarding their potential to induce Europeanisation. By assessing past enlargement rounds, notably the Central and Eastern European enlargement and the ongoing Western Balkans enlargement, the objective is to provide for a thorough account of the effectiveness of Europeanisation in the Balkans, especially as regards EU conditionality in the area of the rule of law.
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Introduction

EU scholars have attempted to approach EU integration and, subsequently, EU enlargement and Europeanisation through the lens of theories of international relations and comparative politics, and more recently game-theory (e.g., principal-agent models) and transaction cost theoretical approaches. Nevertheless, although different periods of EU enlargement and Europeanisation can be explained through such approaches, none of them seems to offer a satisfactory, conclusive theoretical framework. Similarly, while conditionality has been long deployed by international organisations and governments such as the International Monetary Fund, the United States, and the EU, it is still unclear why certain governments respond positively to external incentives while others do not. Understanding the reasons behind such behaviours would not only improve the theoretical framework but would also provide the EU and aspiring Member States with insights on what issues need to be raised in the accession process, and which domestic conditions need to apply for an effective Europeanisation.

According to rationalist theories, such as rational choice institutionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, all candidate states have diligently performed a cost-benefit analysis of accession, and have concluded that accession efforts, costly as they may be, are worth their while (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998 & 2018, Hall & Taylor, 1996, Weingast, 1996, Schimmelfennig, 2003, Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005, Pollack, 2007, Schneider & Ershova, 2018). However, experience shows that sometimes candidate states take a rather opportunistic approach by resorting to ´paper compliance´ instead of adopting meaningful reforms and building the institutions that are necessary for real democratisation and modernisation. While the EU might be turning a blind eye in certain cases of incomplete Europeanisation, reversing substantial reforms or ignoring recommendations during the accession process in fundamental policy areas are still exceptions to the rule lacking a conclusive explanation as to why they occur.

By relying on a diverse and well-established literature, this chapter applies theoretical models, notably the External Incentives Model and other rationalist approaches, as well as sociological institutionalism as an alternative theory, to cases of Central, Eastern European and Western Balkan candidate states, with the aim being to provide for an explanation for the divergence in the Europeanisation process of the Western Balkans candidate states.

Key Terms in this Chapter

EFTA: European Free Trade Association.

EIM: External incentives model.

Twinning: European Union instrument for institutional cooperation between public administrations of EU Member States and of beneficiary or partner countries.

EU: European Union.

SAA: Stabilisation and association agreements.

OSCE: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

TEU: Treaty of the European Union.

ENCJ: European Network of Councils for Judiciary.

US: United States.

CEE: Central and Eastern European.

ECSC: European Coal and Steel Community.

PHARE: Poland and Hungary assistance for restructuring their economies.

UK: United Kingdom.

SAP: Stabilisation and association process.

Taiex: Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument of the European Commission.

ICTY: International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia.

Acquis Communautaire: European Union laws.

CVM: Cooperation and verification mechanism.

JHA: Area of justice and home affairs.

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