Stability Analysis of EPC Consortium Cooperation Based on Evolutionary Game

Stability Analysis of EPC Consortium Cooperation Based on Evolutionary Game

Judan Hu, Yu Yao, Yuyang Gao
Copyright: © 2024 |Pages: 24
DOI: 10.4018/IJSWIS.339001
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Abstract

Consortium contracting is a contracting model that China encourages and advocates. Due to the interest drive, members within the consortium are very prone to negative cooperation and midway withdrawal, which hinders the healthy development of the consortium. Therefore, this paper constructs a game model of EPC consortium cooperation evolution, analyzes the influence of different reward and punishment mechanisms on the cooperation of consortium members, and applies system dynamics to simulation. The results show that under the static reward and punishment and dynamic reward mechanism, the consortium cooperation is not stable; while under the dynamic punishment mechanism and the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism in which the maximum punishment is greater than the maximum reward, the evolution of consortium cooperation is gradually stable and the behavioral strategies are gradually unified. It also puts forward suggestions for measures conducive to stabilizing cooperation, which provide certain reference value for the internal management of consortium members' cooperation.
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Model Description And Assumptions

Model Description

The EPC project development process led by the design unit involves multiple parties, of which the core subjects are the design and construction units. To better implement the design concept, grasp the overall situation, and plan coordination, highlighting the advantages of the design unit’s lead, this paper takes the design unit as the leading and supervising party of the EPC project, and the construction unit as the implementation of the design concept of the EPC project. Therefore, this paper mainly discusses the impact of the design unit developing different reward and punishment mechanisms on the behavioral strategies of both sides of the EPC consortium.

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