Research on Decision-Making Based on the Three-Party Evolutionary Game of Tourists, Scenic Spots, and Government

Research on Decision-Making Based on the Three-Party Evolutionary Game of Tourists, Scenic Spots, and Government

Xincai Ye, Lin Miao
Copyright: © 2022 |Pages: 23
DOI: 10.4018/JOEUC.315315
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Abstract

The continuous upsurge of tourism consumption activities has promoted economic development, but at the same time, it has also produced numerous problems, such as low-quality service and high admission prices at scenic spots, which are not conducive to the sustainable development of tourism. In this paper, in view of the phenomenon of low-quality service of scenic spots, a three-party evolutionary game model of scenic spots, tourists, and government is constructed under the participation of tourists and the reward-subsidy mechanism and punishment mechanism, and a simulation analysis is performed using the NetLogo platform. The results show that, under the reward-subsidy and punishment mechanisms, the service strategy selection of scenic spots will eventually evolve to provide high-quality services, tourists will eventually choose the no-complaint strategy, and the government will eventually evolve to provide active supervision.
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Literature Review

In recent years, scholars around the world have studied tourism operation and tourism market supervision, and achieved many promising results. Evolutionary game theory analyzes the behaviors of participants in the tourism industry from the perspective of stakeholders (Barari et al., 2012). In the tourism industry, stakeholders include individuals, groups, and organizations, such as tourists, tourism enterprises, local communities, and governments (Baggio et al., 2010). The development of tourism cannot be separated from the participation of stakeholders (Waligo et al., 2015), especially when facing major public crises.

By building a cross-border tourism supply-chain model, Tsaur and Chen (2018) found that the imbalance among the commission, local tour fees, and government supervision costs between the travel agency and the local scenic spots, was the key to the low-cost tour. Yan et al. (2021) analyzed the behavioral interaction and game equilibrium of stakeholders in tourism development by constructing an evolutionary game model among the government, tourists, and tourism enterprises, and discussed the influence of different evolutionary paths and main parameters on strategic choices of stakeholders (Yan et al., 2021).

Huang et al. (2019) studied the generation of green behaviors of tourism enterprises in the process of developing a green tourism supply chain by using evolutionary game theory. Model derivation and simulation data analysis showed that most of the tourism enterprises are indeed motivated to engage in green development, and the formation of a green tourism supply chain is a dynamic evolution process (Huang et al., 2019). Asero et al. (2017) used the game theory model to explain the decision-making process of entrepreneurs in establishing partnerships in the formal tourism network. The research results show that in the Nash equilibrium model, when entrepreneurs have the same business objectives and common tourism vision, the cooperative optimization of a tourism network can be achieved (Asero et al., 2017).

K. Sun et al. (2021), by using evolutionary game theory, has constructed an evolutionary game model composed of three stakeholders: enterprises, tourists and government, replicated the dynamic equation, describing the evolution of the three parties’ operating process, and analyzed the stability of the interaction between stakeholders to determine the bounded rationality of the equilibrium solution. Operation evolution game theory analyzes the dynamic relationship between the tourism scene and the user’s experience, and introduces word-of-mouth as a research parameter to evolve different decisions of tourism enterprise development through the change of user word-of-mouth (Ma & Ding, 2018).

P. He et al. (2018) explored the effective green incentive mechanism for the government to develop traditional tourism into green tourism by establishing a dynamic evolutionary game model among the government, tourism enterprises, and tourists. The evolutionary stabilization strategy (ESS) of Green innovation, and its corresponding conditions for each stakeholder, was discussed, the ESS between tourism enterprises and tourists was analyzed, and the government’s Green regulation was considered. In addition, tourists’ complaints sometimes generate public opinion in social groups.

Gang & Chenglin (2021) dynamically measured and evaluated hotel customer satisfaction through the emotional analysis of online comments. Ng et al. (2021) conducted product satisfaction evaluation through emotional analysis, and showed that tourists’ emotional dynamic comments have an impact on scenic spots and government decision-making strategies.

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