What History Tells Us
Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian general and influential military theorist, defined war as ‘a duel on a larger scale’; an act of force to compel an enemy to do the will of the adversary or target (Clausewitz, 1976). In his book, ‘On War’, Clausewitz focuses on the importance of information, in his ‘intention to provide a thinking man with a frame of reference, rather than to serve as a guide, which at the moment of action lays down precisely the path he must take’ (Clausewitz, 1976).
Sun Tzu promoted the notion that the operation environment must be thoroughly understood (Chen, 1994). Sun Tzu also warned that a commander must exhaustively and dispassionately analyze all information. He would study his enemies and proceed very humbly before engaging in offensive capabilities (Geers, 2011).
Jomini (trans. 2011) focused on the information aspects of a campaign in terms of geometry, especially in areas such as logistics and seapower. He felt that the amount of force that one deployed should be kept to a minimum in order to lower causalities. He viewed, however, that war was not an exact science. He focused on the need of regulation by fixed laws for strategy.
Machiavelli (2015) promoted the value of force and fraud in war. In the ‘Prince’, he counseled how to act towards one’s enemies, i.e., the use of force and fraud were encouraged. He valued information as a valuable source of power that was necessary to win wars.
All of the eminent strategists noted here considered war within a political framework, recognizing the significance of numbers as a practical dimension of war. Sun Tzu and Machiavelli saw war as an integral part of the political order—a tool of power (desaxx, 2010).